The Emergence of a General Reformation Doctrine for Wills by Waggoner, Lawrence W. & Langbein, John H.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1983
The Emergence of a General Reformation Doctrine
for Wills
Lawrence W. Waggoner
University of Michigan Law School, waggoner@umich.edu
John H. Langbein
Yale Law School, john.langbein@yale.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/567
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Common Law Commons, Courts Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons,
Legislation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Waggoner, Lawrence A. "The Emergence of a General Reformation Doctrine for Wills." J. H. Langbein, co-author. Law Quad. Notes
28, no. 1 (1983): 19-28.
by Lawrence W. Waggoner and John H. Langbein 
DWcreparzcitr,{ in the Will 
I \ 
lthough it has been axiomatic that 
our courts do not entertain suits to 
reform wills on the ground of 
mistake, appellate courts in New 
York, Michigan, New Jersey, and 
California have decided cases 
within the last several years that may presage the 
abandonment of the ancient "no-reformation" 
rule. (In re Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 418 N.E.2d 656, 
437 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1981); Estate of Krernlick, 331 
N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1983); En Ie v .  Sie el, 74 N.J. 
287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977); an d Estate ofTaff, 63 
Cal. App. 3d 319, 133 Cal.Rptr. 737 (1976).) 
The new cases do not purport to make this funda- 
mental doctrinal change, although the New York 
court did announce an explicit exception to the no- 
reformation rule and the other three courts did dis- 
claim a related rule, sometimes called the "plain 
meaning" rule. That rule, which we will be calling 
the "no-extrinsic-evidence rule," prescribes that 
courts not receive evidence about the testator's intent 
apart from, or in opposition to, the legal effect of 
the language he uses in the will itself. The three 
courts said that they were consulting extrinsic evi- 
dence (in the California and New Jersey cases, 
primarily the testimony of the lawyers whose poor 
draftsmanship had led to the litigation) in order to 
engage in "construction" of supposedly ambiguous 
instruments. 
In this article, which both summarizes and updates 
an extensively footnoted article published last year 
("Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: 
Change of Direction in American Law?" 130 Univer- 
sity of Pennsylvania Law Rmiew 521 (1982)), we report 
on this new case law and discuss the analytic frame- 
work that we think it suggests and requires. 
We shall discuss the three purported construction 
cases first and then turn to the more candid New 
York precedent. 
The will in the Krernlick case devised half the testa- 
tor's residuary estate "to the Michigan Cancer 
Society." Although there was an organization of that 
name, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a brief opin- 
ion, allowed another organization (the American 
Cancer Society, Michigan Division) to have a trial on 
the question of which was actually the intended ben- 
eficiary. The issue on remand, therefore, will be 
whether to prefer extrinsic evidence of the testator's 
intent over the explicit language of his will. 
In Engle v .  Siege1 the two testators, spouses, named 
their children as their residuary devisees; in the 
event the children predeceased them, each estate was 
to pass equally to the spouses' mothers. The spouses 
and children died in a hotel fire, predeceased, how- 
ever, by one of the two spouses' mothers. Under the 
routine constructional law of the jurisdiction, the sur- 
viving mother would have taken the entirety of the 
two estates, since she was the sole surviving resi- 
duary devisee. The heirs of the predeceased mother 
contested and won. Extrinsic evidence of the spouses' 
deliberations with their lawyer at the time of the 
drafting of their wills showed that they had inclined 
to name their respective families as contingent resi- 
duary devisees, and that they had chosen to name 
the two mothers only after the lawyer had pointed 
out that the word "family" was imprecise. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court said: 
We have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the 
primary wish of each decedent, given the contingency 
that occurred, would have been to divide the property 
included in their residuary estates between the [families of 
the two mothers]. The designation of their respective moth- 
ers resulted solely from the scrivener's rejection of the word 
"family" as a term to describe the recipient of a testamen- 
tary benefaction. Each mother was obviously thought of as 
an appropriate representative of a "family." 
Extrinsic evidence was thereby used to contradict the 
language of the wills. 
The testatrix in Taff devised the residue of her 
estate to her sister Margaret, or if Margaret prede- 
ceased her (which was the contingency that in fact 
occurred), "to my heirs in accordance with the laws 
of intestate succession. . . ." Her residuanr estate 
consisted of community property to which she had 
succeeded by virtue of its community character on 
the death of her husband. The California probate 
code provided that in the event such property passed 
by intestacy, it should descend in equal halves to 
the heirs of the predeceased spouse and of the dece- 
dent. Accordingly, the effect of the language in the 
will adopting the heirship definition of the intestacy 
statute would have been-if applied-to pass half 
of her property to the heirs of her late husband, and 
half to her natural heirs (who were at her death some 
nieces and a nephew). In the trial court, the 
testatrix's natural heirs claimed the entire estate, on 
the ground that she meant to designate only them. In 
order to prove her actual intent, her natural heirs 
offered the testimony of her lawyer, who testified 
that she had instructed him to draft her will so that 
the residue went "to her own family, her own blood 
relatives." The intermediate court of appeals followed 
the trial court and sustained the claim of the 
testatrix's natural heirs to take the entire estate. 
As in the Michigan and New Jersey cases, the key 
departure in Tuff was the court's expansive treatment 
of the purpose for which it would consider evidence 
contradicting the terms of the will. In a statement 
that significantly breaks from prior law while seem- 
ing to invoke it, the court declared: "Extrinsic 
evidence was properly received both to create the 
ambiguity in the word 'heirs' and to resolve the 
ambiguity." This way of stating the matter obliterates 
the fundamental distinction between ambiguity and 
mistake. The disputed term in Taff that had been 
mistakenly employed was quite unambiguous. The 
effect of the decision in Taff was to substitute a 
phrase such as "my natural heirs" for the inapt 
phrase that the will had employed ("my heirs in 
accordance with the laws of intestate succession") in 
order to carry out what the court conceived to be 
the actual or subjective intent of the testatrix. 
In each of these cases-Kremlick, Engle  v.  Siegel  
and Tuff-the wills were utterly unambiguous. What 
each court actually did was to allow extrinsic evi- 
dence of the testator's intent to be preferred over the 
contrary but mistaken language in the wdl. 
In the New York case, I n  re Sn ide ,  the New York 
Court of Appeals had to face one of the recurrent 
mistake situations: Husband and wife each signed a 
will prepared for the other, and only after the death 
of the husband was it discovered that he signed the 
wrong will. Harvey Snide signed the will prepared 
for his wife Rose, on account of the error of the law- 
yer-draftsman who supervised the joint execution 
ceremony. The first-instance court brushed aside the 
argument that strict compliance with the Wills Act 
prevented remedy for "a mistake so obvious." The 
court granted an application to reform the will, order- 
ing that the words "Harvey," "Rose," and "wife" be 
substituted for "Rose," "Harvey," and "husband," 
respectively. 
The first-instance court in Sn ide  reached its result 
on general equitable principles, apparently without 
having understood that in the law of wills reforma- 
tion has been refused even for "a mistake so 
obvious." The intermediate appellate court reversed 
in a memorandum opinion limited to pointing out 
that the judgment below ignored contrary New York 
appellate authority. In 1981, the New York Court of 
Appeals in tum reversed the appellate division and 
sustained the power of the first-instance court to 
reform the will. Unlike the courts in Kremlick ,  
Engle v. Siegel ,  and Taff, the New York court admitted 
that it was granting reformation of a w d ,  and it recog- 
nized how strongly that step contravened the former 
law. Nevertheless, the court advanced no significant 
justification for its departure. Its main concern was to 
limit its decision to this "very unusual case." The 
factors that the court mentioned in order to justify 
making the exception are factors that could (and in 
the view we develop below, should) be decisive in 
other cases of supposed mistake: (1) the high quality 
of the evidence of the mistake, and (2) the irnpor- 
tance of serving the underlying policy of the Wills 
Act, which is to implement the testator's true intent. 
We think that the "mere exception" rubric of Sn ide  
is ultimately no more defensible than the "mere con- 
struction" theory in Kremlick ,  Engle v .  Siegel ,  and 
Taff. The Sn ide  case is, however, a milestone on the 
path toward a general reformation doctrine, because 
an Anglo-American court has now expressly acted 
to grant reformation of a will on the ground of 
mistake. 
The inclination of modem courts to prevent injus- 
tice despite a long tradition of refusing to remedy 
mistakes in wills is, in our view, laudable. We do 
not, however, believe that courts should continue to 
reach such results by doctrinal sleight-of-hand. 
Rather, we take the position that the time has come 
for forthright judicial reconsideration of the no-refor- 
mation rule. We believe that a reformation doctrine 
shaped and limited according to criteria that we 
identify below has the capacity to prevent much of 
the hardship associated with the former rule, while 
effectively dealing with the concerns that motivated 
the rule. 
The C o n t r u t  w&h Nonprobate Tramferd: 
The Ev2entiary Policy 
The no-reformation rule is peculiar to the law of 
wdls. It does not apply to other modes of gratuitous 
transfer-the so-called nonprobate transfers-even 
though many are virtually indistinguishable from the 
will in function. Reformation lies routinely to correct 
mistakes, both of expression and of omission, in 
deeds of gift, inter vivos trusts, life insurance con- 
tracts, and other instruments that serve to transfer 
wealth to donees upon the transferor's death. 
Courks have been willing to use their equity pow- 
ers in these nonprobate situations, because a case 
of well-proven mistake necessarily invokes the funda- 
mental principle of the law of restitution: preventing 
unjust enrichment. If the mistake is not corrected, the 
mistaken beneficiary is unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the intended beneficiary. 
Judicial intervention to prevent unjust enrichment 
has such a manifestly compelling doctrinal basis that 
the puzzle is to explain why the courts have not been 
willing to act similarly when the document affected 
by the mistake is a will. Unjust enrichment is equally 
wrong whether the resulting error occurs in an inter 
vivos transfer or in a will. Both transfers are gratui- 
tous, both unilateral. Accordingly, we emphasize as a 
starting point that the no-reformation rule for wills 
cannot rest on the notion that there is no wrong to 
remedy. Why, then, does equity refuse to remedy 
unjust enrichment in the case of a mistaken will? 
The customary justification has to do with the 
nature of the evidence in cases of testation. Evidence 
suggesting that the document is affected by 
mistake-that the will is at variance with the testa- 
tor's actual intent-must necessarily be presented 
when death has placed the testator beyond reply. The 
testimony will typically involve statements allegedly 
made by the testator, so-called direct declarations 
of intent, which he can now neither corroborate nor 
deny. The testator's main protection against fabri- 
cated or mistaken evidence is the will itself. 
Therefore, it has been argued, evidence extrinsic to 
the will should be excluded; and i f  the extrinsic evi- 
dence is excluded, the court can not learn of the 
ground upon which the reformation claim rests. 
The law of nonprobate transfers supplies two per- 
suasive answers. First, although the living donor 
under an inter vivos instrument can take the stand 
and test* about his true intent, this testimony does 
not have automatic reliability. The donor's testimony 
doubtless reflects his current intent, but the matter 
in issue is his intent at the time the instrument was 
executed. The instrument may have stated this intent 
accurately; he may since have changed his mind and 
now be lying or deceiving himself, or he may be 
mistaken about what he originally intended. Conse- 
quently, even the donor's own testimony is properly 
regarded as inherently suspect, which is why even 
such testimony is put to the clear-and-convincing- 
evidence test. 
Second, and still more telling, reformation of docu- 
ments effecting gratuitous inter vivos transfers is 
routinely granted even after the death of the donor. 
In these cases the extrinsic evidence is inherently 
suspect for exactly the reason that evidence of a testa- 
tor's intent is suspect when offered against a will. 
Nevertheless, in nonprobate transfers when the clear- 
and-convincing-evidence standard has been satisfied, 
clauses omitted by mistake have been inserted. The 
courts have corrected mistaken designations of the 
beneficiaries, of the property intended to have been 
the subject matter of the gift, and of the extent of the 
interest intended to have been granted to the benefi- 
ciary. Documents drafted by lawyers (or others) have 
not been distinguished from self-drawn documents; 
enrichment of an unintended donee at the expense of 
the intended donee is unjust whether the mistake 
has been made by the donor or by his lawyer. The 
essential safeguard in these cases has been the dear- 
and-convincing-evidence standard, which appellate 
courts have policed rigorously. 
Accordingly, we believe that the evidentiary prob- 
lem, although important, does not in fact explain or 
justify the no-reformation rule in matters of testa- 
mentary mistake. If the courts had not been deeply 
worried about another policy, namely, compliance 
with Wills Act formality, we think that they would 
long ago have followed the evidentiary practice of 
nonprobate transfers for dealing with claims of mis- 
take regarding wills. Instead of excluding the 
evidence, and thereby foreclosing any chance of 
proving the mistake, the courts would have dealt 
with the potential unreliability of the evidence by 
admitting it and testing it against the higher-than- 
ordinary standard of proof that has worked so well in 
the law of nonprobate transfers. 
Unaerdtan2ing the No-Reformation Rule: 
The Unattedtea Language Problem 
The great obstacle to reformation in the law of 
wills has been remedial rather than evidentiarv. The 
real problem has not been proving the mistaki with 
adequate certainty, but remedying it in a fashion 
consistent with the requirements of Wills Act formal- 
ity. When the particular mistake that has affected a 
will is one that would require a court to supply an 
omitted term or to substitute language outside the 
will in dace of a mistaken term, the obiection arises 
that the' language to be supplied was nAt written, 
signed, and attested as required by the Wills Act. 
Reformation would amear to have the courts inter- 
I I 
polating unattested language into will. 
In our article in the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, we have pointed to a variety of settings 
where practice in-the traditional law of testamentan 
mistake shows that the courts are less serious about 
the evidentiary problem than they are about the 
vroblem of technical Wills Act com~liance. When a 
mistake can be corrected by means of a theory that 
does not appear to conflict with the Wills Act, exist- 
ine doctrines ~ e r m i t  the extrinsic evidence to be 
" 
admitted in order to prove the mistake. The courts 
purport to fear the potential unreliability of extrinsic 
evidence when they exclude it, yet they admit extrin- 
sic evidence in the-contexts in which it is equally 
unreliable. Where the courts have been able to rem- 
edy mistakes, they have manipulated notions of 
construction in G o  ways: primarily by refusing effect 
to mistaken but attested language, but occasionally 
by conferring the imprimatur of attestation upon 
unattested language, that is, language not contained 
in the will. 
It is essential to understand that the unattested 
language problem raises a technical or formal rather 
than a purposive question. The purpose of having all 
the terms of a will attested is evidentiary, which is 
why it is so important that the courts have shown 
themselves able to deal effectively with the concern 
about the quality of the proofs in the fraction of mis- 
take cases that are now remediable. Accordingly, 
we believe that the primary impediment to the adop- 
tion of a general reformation doctrine for wills has 
been the seeming need for technical adherence to the 
Wdls Act, rather than any judgment that it would 
offend the underlying purpose of the Wills Act to 
remedy well-proven mistakes. That, in turn, throws 
light on why the no-reformation rule has produced 
results so harsh. In countless cases of palpable mis- 
take, the courts have felt obliged to enforce the Wills 
Act literally even though it is manifest that to do so 
defeats the basic goal of the Wills Act, which is to 
implement the testator's intent. 
As indicated above, the primary way that courts 
manipulate notions of construction to correct a mis- 
take without appearing to conflict with the Wills Act 
is by refusing effect to mistaken but attested lan- 
guage. This maneuver is possible in cases of 
ambiguity. Situations involving ambiguous expres- 
sion constitute a significant fraction of the mistakes 
that occur in wills, and even under traditional law, 
mistakes of this type are remediable in will construc- 
tion suits. Ironically, therefore, the availability of 
remedy for this kind of mistake has played a role in 
keeping the no-reformation rule in force by reducing 
the pressure to reexamine it. 
The ambiguity doctrine has two basic elements: (1) 
where the will contains an ambiguity, extrinsic evi- 
dence is admissible to clarify it; and (2) if necessary, 
mistaken parts of a will may be disregarded in order 
to give effect to intention proved by extrinsic evi- 
dence. The leading American decision enunciating 
these principles is Patch v .  White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886), 
decided by a sharply divided United States Supreme 
Court in 1886. The testator's will devised to his 
brother a parcel of land described as "lot numbered 
six, in square four hundred and three, together with 
the improvements thereon erected and appurtenances 
thereto belonging-being a lot which belongs to me, 
and not specifically devised to any other person in 
this my will." Extrinsic evidence revealed a latent 
ambiguity: There was a conflict between the descrip- 
tion contained in the will and the subject matter of 
the gift. Although there was a square 403, and it 
contained a lot number 6, the testator did not (and 
never did) own that lot and there were no improve- 
ments on it. The Court then repeated a maxim that 
still appears in the decisions. "It is settled doctrine," 
the Court said, "that as a latent ambiguity is only 
disclosed by extrinsic evidence it may be removed by 
extrinsic evidence." The extrinsic evidence showed 
that the testator did own lot number 3, in square 406, 
and that this lot had not been specifically devised 
and was improved with a dwelling house. The Court 
found that the testator intended to devise this lot 3 
to his brother, and that his intent could be given 
effect by "striking out the false description." In effect, 
the Court treated the testator's will as though it 
devised "lot number [blank], in square four hundred 
and [blank]. . . ." The Court the found that other 
evidence sufficed to establish the correct lot and 
square numbers: Lot 3 in square 406 was the only 
one the testator owned in a square whose number 
commenced with four hundred and that was not oth- 
erwise specifically disposed of in his will. The Court 
analogized this process of construction to the con- 
struction of words "blurred by accident so as to be 
illegible"; cases in which words have been judicially 
striken or disregarded because of mistake, the Court 
concluded, should be resolved in the same way. 
The process employed in Patch v .  White has been 
routinely applied to descriptions of devisees as well 
as property. At present, therefore, if an ambiguity is 
found to exist, courts are prepared to admit just that 
sort of extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent 
(including his direct declarations) that would have to 
be admitted if a general reformation doctrine for wdls 
were to be adopted. 
Why is it that the admissibility of such evidence is 
conditioned on the appearance of a so-called ambigu- 
ity? We infer that it is not the quality of the evidence 
but the availability of a theory of remedy that 
explains the courts' willingness to correct mistakes 
that can be characterized as resulting in ambiguity. 
The great attraction of the ambiguity label is that 
it virtually assures that a court can effect a remedy 
within the confines of the Wills Act. Ambiguity 
invokes the theory of construction rather than of ref- 
ormation. When a court "construes" attested 
language, it "discovers" what the "ambiguous" 
words of the will "really" mean, whereas when a 
court reforms an instrument, it forthrightly supplies 
language from without. Although in truth the court 
in Patch v. White supplied omitted lot and section 
numbers, the ambiguity rubric permitted it to say 
that it was construing words within the will. 
Courts do not openly discuss why the Wills Act is 
seen as allowing attested language to be stricken 
while not allowing unattested language to be 
inserted. We suspect that the underlying notion is 
that attested but mistaken language lacks testamen- 
tary intent. It is well accepted that a wdl executed 
wholly by mistake is invalid, on the ground that it 
lacks testamentary intent. In Patch v .  White, when 
"lot 6 of square 403" was effectively rendered as "lot 
[blank] of square [blank]," the court was determining 
that the misdescriptions lacked testamentary intent 
and could be disregarded. In effect, Patch v.  White 
involved partial denial of probate for want of testa- 
mentary intent. If the courts were not so frightened 
of the Wills Act, they would not meander in cases 
like Patch v. White. The device of striking out and 
then construing the resulting blanks is sufficiently 
awkward (by comparison with reformation) that it 
leaves little room for doubt about why it is done: It 
gives the appearance of Wills Act compliance. There 
are a variety of other doctrines in which reformation- 
like results are achieved by construction tricks. These 
indude the dependent relative revocation rule, which 
corrects mistakes by implying remedies as condi- 
tions, and the personal usage doctrine, which saves 
some instruments containing seeming misnomers. 
In addition to the ambiguity-striking out cases, 
courts have found other ways to correct mistakes 
without appearing to conflict with the Wills Act. 
Occasionally, the courts confer the imprimatur of 
attestation upon unattested language, for example, by 
the technique of implying future interests. Among 
the recurrent situations that have given rise to an 
implied future interest is the dispositive plan "To A 
for life, then to B if A dies without issue." If A dies 
with issue, a remainder in favor of such issue has 
been implied on the ground that the import of the 
condition attached to B's remainder makes it highly 
probable that the testator's primary objective was 
to benefit A's issue if A left any. In this and other 
appropriate situations, courts "construct" omitted 
provisions out of the so-called general dispositive 
plan of the testator; the idea that words can be 
inserted into a will in this way is widely accepted. 
The Wills Act is not seen as posing an obstacle to 
this process because the inserted words are deemed 
to be constructed out of, or implied from, the attested 
words. The inserted words are thus seen as having 
the imprimatur of attestation. 
Finally, we may point out that there are special 
types of mistakes that some courts have been willing 
to correct by openly reforming wills. An early deci- 
sion of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
adopted a reformation doctrine for perpetuity viola- 
tions, and this has been followed by the Supreme 
Courts of Hawaii, Mississippi, and West Virginia. 
See generally, Waggoner, "Perpetuity Reform," 81 
Mich. L.Rev. 1718, 1755-1759 (1983). These courts 
were preoccupied with the problems of perpetuity 
law, and did not explain how their results could be 
squared with the no-reformation rule in the law of 
wills. Courts have also openly reformed wills in one 
type of tax case, a recent example of which is Estate 
of Burdon-Miller, 456 A.2d 1266 (Me. 1983). The Inter- 
nal Revenue Code, section 2055(e)(3), grants an estate 
tax charitable deduction for certain charitable remain- 
der trusts, if they have been created by wills that 
were executed prior to a certain date and if, after the 
testator's death, they were "amended or conformed" 
to the charitable remainder trust requirements as a 
result of judicial proceedings begun prior to a certain 
date. The state courts seem to have taken this federal 
statutory provision as somehow overriding the state 
Wills Act, so as to authorize the insertion of unat- 
tested language into wills. Elsewhere in the tax cases 
we find instances in which courts, mainly through 
doctrinal sleight-of-hand, have in effect reformed 
wills-without conceding that they were doing so- 
in order to conform testamentary provisions with 
such tax requirements as those applicable to the mar- 
ital deduction. 
Overcom'ng the ProbCern of 
Unattwtea Language 
The no-reformation rule rests on the view that the 
courts cannot supply missing language, because the 
language to be supplied has not been written down, 
signed, and attested as required by the Wills Act. 
Reformation would require the validation of unat- 
tested language. The recent cases, described earlier, 
sidestepped the unattested language problem by 
manipulating the construction process or, in the case 
of Snide, by establishing an "exception" deemed by 
the court to be too narrow to call the underlying no- 
reformation rule into question. 
We propose to dispute the argument that the Wills 
Act attestation requirements dictate the no-reforma- 
tion rule. In the following section we point the way 
to a theory that would allow reformation to confer the 
imprimatur of compliance upon language that must 
be supplied in order to remedy a mistaken omission 
or to correct a mistaken term in a will that has been 
otherwise executed in compliance with the formal 
requirements of the Wills Act. This compliance-type 
theory is derived from the practice of the courts in 
the most analogous area of private law, namely, cases 
in which language has been mistakenly omitted from 
or mistakenlv rendered in an instrument that must 
comply with the formal requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds. 
We then discuss a second theorv. also with an 
.I' 
ample common law pedigree, that could be employed 
in many mistake cases in order to overcome the unat- 
tested language problem. We call this theory 
"remedying wrongdoing"; we derive it from the 
quite similar notion that has been developed in con- 
structive trust cases. Where the mistake that has 
affected the will has been the product of a wrong, for 
example the negligence of the lawyer-draftsman, the 
constructive trust cases provide by way of analogy an 
independent basis for reformation: preventing harm 
to the innocent victim of third-party wrongdoing. 
Cot7zpliat.zce Theory: AnalogLnhg from Practice 
uni'er the Statute of F r a ~ d ~  
The no-reformation rule has been justified on the 
ground that a contrary practice would allow oral wills 
in violation of the Wills Act attestation requirements. 
So also the so-called "oral contract" argument has 
been made respecting the Statute of Frauds. The stat- 
ute is argued tb be violated when oral evidence is 
" 
adduced to show that an instrument subject to the 
Statute contains a mistaken term or lacks a term that 
was intended. 
In his notable article, "Reformation and the Statute 
of Frauds," 65 Mich. L.Rev. 421 (1967), George Pal- 
mer showed why the "oral contract" argument was 
fallacious and not a barrier to reformini the instru- 
" 
ment. The parties' attempt to express their 
transaction in writing is also an attempt to express in 
writing the deficient or omitted term. From the 
" 
standpoint of the purposes of the formal require- 
ments of the Statute of Frauds, there is a considerable 
difference between noncompliance and defective 
compliance. The cautionarfand evidentiary purposes 
of the Statute of Frauds are largely achieved in the 
attempt at due execution. The object of reformation 
in these cases is not to enforce an oral transaction but 
to make a written transaction conform to the true 
understanding of the parties. "To say that reforma- 
tion amounts to enforcement of the oral agreement," 
Palmer argued, "overlooks the significance of . . . the 
act of the parties by which they sought to tum the 
oral understanding into a legally enforceable agree- 
ment through expression in the writing. In the view 
of most judges, equity performs a proper role when 
it corrects the consequences of mistake so as to make 
the situation correspond, not merely to what the par- 
ties intended, but to what they also attempted to 
effectuate." 
The safeguard that prevents reformation from 
being abused, for example, by being employed to 
interpolate a spurious term, is the ancient require- 
ment of an exceptionally high standard of proof in 
reformation cases. Palmer's conclusion, for which he 
adduces considerable support in the case law, is that 
the Statute of Frauds "should not prevent reformation 
in any case in which it is found by clear and con- 
vincing evidence that through mistake a writing fails 
to express the terms [that] the parties to an agree- 
ment intended to express in the writing." 
In a companion article, "Reformation and the Par01 
Evidence Rule." 65 Mich. L.Rev. 833 (1967), Palmer , , 
demonstrated that the parol evidence'rule, properly 
understood, does not hinder the trier from consulting 
extrinsic evidence in these cases. Following Wig- 
more, Corbin, and much modem authority, Palmer 
showed that the so-called integration doctrine limits 
application of the parol evidence rule to cases in 
which "the writing was intended to be a complete 
and accurate embodiment of the agreement." Hence, 
"[tlhe parol evidence rule of itself is never an obsta- 
cle to reformation, provided there is satisfactory 
evidence of a mistake in integration." Once again, it 
is the heavy burden of proof according to a clear- 
and-convincing-evidence reauirement that is the real 
" 
safeguard against fraud and other abuse, rather than 
the categorical denial of relief. 
We think that Palmer's analysis applies with f d  
cogency to the Wills Act. Transposed to the setting of 
the Wills Act, Palmer's analysis highlights the differ- 
ence between an oral will and the use of oral or other 
extrinsic evidence in order to correct or to supply a 
term in a duly executed will. Whereas an oral will 
instances total noncompliance with the Wills Act 
formalities, a duly executed will with a mistakenly 
rendered term involves high levels of compliance 
with both the letter and the pumose of the Wills Act 
L A 
formalities. To the extent that a mistake case risks 
impairing any policy of the Wills Act, it is the evi- 
dentiary policy that is in question. But, as Palmer 
points out, the decisive feature of the law of reforma- 
tion in the inter vivos transfer cases has been its 
alternative evidentiary safeguard, the requirement of 
an exceptionally high standard of proof. A modern 
reformation doctrine for the law of wills will certainly 
adhere to this clear-and-convincing-evidence 
standard. 
A substantially identical analysis appeared in 1973 
in a report to the Lord Chancellor by England's offi- 
cial Law Reform Committee. The Committee found 
itself unable to identlfy tenable reasons "why the 
equitable doctrine of rectification [the English term 
for reformation] does not apply to wills." It dis- 
missed the unattested language argument on the 
ground that "in the case of other documents the doc- 
trine of rectification applies even though statute 
requires them to be in a particular form, for example, 
under seal; and evidence of what words a will was 
intended to contain may fall far short of general evi- 
dence of the testator's dispositive intention." In other 
words, relief against mistake does not augur the 
enforcement of oral wills. Courts do and should dis- 
tinguish between noncompliance with formal 
requirements and the extensive compliance character- 
istic of mistake cases. The Committee also echoed 
Palmer in trusting for safeguard to the higher stan- 
dard of proof already developed in the law of 
rectification for inter vivos instuments. 
Rem&ing Wrong2ohg: En forchg Unattedte2 
Intention in Open Drjregar2 of the W& Act. 
In mistake cases, the testator has typically sought 
out, paid for, and relied upon the work of counsel. 
To frustrate the wishes of a testator who had the 
prudence to follow counsel's direction seems espe- 
cially offensive if it is avoidable. Since testators 
cannot be expected to discover their lawyers' mis- 
takes, the question is whether to charge them with 
such mistakes when the evidence clearly establishes 
what was really wanted. We think it palpable that 
in these circumstances the testator's intent should be 
implemented if it can be proved with appropriate 
certainty. 
It is well established that when a devisee or an 
heir commits a wrong-by fraud, undue influence, 
or duress-in procuring his devise or in preventing 
disinheritance, a court of equity w d  prevent the 
wrongdoer from benefiting. Further, when the act of 
wrongdoing deprives an intended beneficiary of a 
devise or an inheritance, the court can impose a con- 
structive trust in his favor. 
The willingness of the courts to intervene in these 
cases invites comparison with the two policies on 
which the general no-reformation rule rests: the 
potential unreliability of the extrinsic evidence and 
the need for adherence to Wills Act formality. 
When a will is alleged to have been affected by 
wrongdoing, both the fact of the wrongful act and 
the identity of the wrongfully deprived beneficiary 
must be proved by extrinsic evidence. This evidence 
is of the same character and inherent untrustworthi- 
ness as the evidence that would be required under 
a general reformation doctrine of the sort we 
advocate. 
When a constructive trust is imposed on a wrong- 
doer, and when it is imposed in favor of the 
intended and wrongfully deprived beneficiary, the 
courts are ordering that the decedent's property be 
transferred to a person who was not designated to 
take it in a validly executed will. In order to appreci- 
ate the significance of this, it is important to observe 
that the policy against preventing a wrongdoer from 
profiting by his own wrong could be served in a 
more limited way that would be much more faithful 
to the supposed virtue of Wills Act obeisance. Rather 
than impose the constructive trust for the benefit of 
the intended beneficiary who was not named in the 
will, the courts could impose the constructive trust 
for the benefit of the testator's estate, coupled with 
the direction that the estate pass as though the 
wrongdoer had predeceased the testator and the 
wrongdoer's interest in the estate had lapsed. Under 
such a decree, the estate would pass entirely to the 
remaining beneficiaries (the innocent devisees named 
in the will, or in the event of partial or total intes- 
tacy, the innocent heirs). The court's only tampering 
with the attested instrument would be by way of 
deletion, on the familiar ground that a nominal 
devise tainted by wrongdoer's conduct lacks testa- 
mentary intent. 
Why have the courts not followed this less adven- 
turous path, which we might call the "mere deletion" 
approach? The answer, which is well understood in 
the case law and the literature, is that mere deletion 
would still leave unjust enrichment unremedied. 
Although it would effectively deny the wrongdoer his 
spoils, it would allow his wrongful act to result in a 
benefit for the remaining innocent beneficiaries at 
the expense of the intended beneficiary. The courts 
have preferred the rule that a constructive trust action 
lies even against innocent beneficiaries, in order that 
they not be unjustly enriched at the expense of the 
intended beneficiary on account of the wrongdoer's 
conduct. 
Accordingly, it is safe to say that in the construc- 
tive trust cases the courts have determined that the 
policy of correcting unjust enrichment resulting from 
wrongdoing prevails against the policy of literal 
adherence to Wills Act formality. If this principle 
were extended from the cases of intentional wrong- 
doing, where it is now entrenched, to cases of 
negligent wrongdoing, it could supply the theory for 
relief in many of the most egregious mistake cases 
that under traditional law go unremedied. 
We think that the "remedying-wrongdoing" ration- 
ale in the constructive trust cases should apply to 
those mistake cases in which the mistake results from 
the poor draftsmanship of a lawyer (or other scrive- 
ner), as in cases like Taff and Engle v.  Siegel; or from 
negligent supervision of clerical work, or of the exe- 
cution process as in cases like Snide. The courts have 
shown themselves able to overcome the evidentiary 
difficulties in the constructive trust cases. If the law- 
yer's wrong in a mistake case is not corrected, an 
unintended beneficiary is unjustly enriched at the 
expense of the intended taker. To be sure, the con- 
structive trust cases that arise in circumstances of 
fraud and force can be distinguished, because the 
lawyer's wrongful conduct in the mistake case is neg- 
ligent rather than intentional; but the distinction 
between intentional and negligent wrongdoing seems 
misplaced as a ground for denying relief in these 
mistake cases. A wrong is a wrong; and in the mis- 
take cases the testator's claim is more worthy of relief 
than in most of the cases where remedy is now 
granted, because the testator sought out and followed 
the advice of counsel. 
The Reformation Doctrine 
The iGpulse to relieve against mistake is strongly 
felt in modem courts, as the Kremlick, Taff, Engle v. 
Siegel, and Snide cases illustrate. Yet because the 
black letter law has seemed so hostile, courts have 
often given remedy in specious or unreasoned theo- 
ries of decision. We think that, with the no-extrinsic- 
evidence rule now undergoing abrogation and with 
the Wills Act formal requirements understood to be 
not an obstacle, a principled reformation doctrine can 
be formulated that will strike the proper balance 
between the concerns that underlie the old no-refor- 
mation rule and the factors that have made that rule 
ever more unpalatable. 
The reformation doctrine will exhibit considerable 
simplicity. The three elements of the doctrine, 
already to be observed in the reformation doctrine for 
non-probate transfers, we label the (1) materiality, 
(2) particularity, and (3) burden-of-proof require- 
ments. Each is directly responsive to the evidentiary 
concerns that were so prominent in discussions of 
the old no-reformation rule. 
The materiality and particularity elements will 
require that the error be shown to have affected spe- 
cific terms in the will and that the mistake claim be 
sufficiently circumscribed to be susceptible of proof. 
The contention that "if only my aunt had understood 
how much I loved her, she'd have left me more," will 
not suffice to transform disappointment into mistake. 
The essential safeguard for a reformation doctrine 
in the law of wills is a standard of proof effective 
to deal with the evidentiary concerns to which the 
former no-reformation rule was addressed. Although 
that rule has been found too harsh, it did respond 
to the danger of false contentions that a testator now 
dead made a mistake in his duly executed will. We 
have said that a modern reformation doctrine for 
wills must follow the law of nonprobate transfers by 
placing upon the proponent of a mistake claim the 
burden of proving it by evidence of exceptional qual- 
ity. The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is 
pitched above the ordinary preponderance-of-the-evi- 
dence test characteristic of most civil litigation, but 
below the beyond-reasonable-doubt rule of the crimi- 
nal law. 
In Kremlick, Taff, and Engle v .  Siegel, where the no- 
reformation rule'was avoi&ed by that 
they were "mere construction" cases, the appropriate 
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard was not 
articulated. One of the advantages of recognizing an 
explicit reformation doctrine is that the pressure to 
conceal reformation as mere construction should 
largely vanish. When mistake cases can be admitted 
for what they are, they can be held to the higher 
standard of proof appropriate to them. Paradoxically, 
therefore, abandonment of the no-reformation rule 
will sometimes result in greater fidelity to those evi- 
dentiary concerns that prompted the no-reformation 
rule. Experience suggests that the evidentiary policies 
of the no-reformation rule would be better served 
under the opposite rule. 
Testation is a field in which planning values are 
quite rightly viewed as paramount. Since the will 
comes into effect when the testator is powerless to 
change it, certainty and predictability are at least as 
important here as in any field of law. If the develop- 
ment of a mistake doctrine were to jeopardize well- 
drafted instruments, the gain would surely not be 
worth the cost. 
Would a reformation doctrine open every estate to 
the depredation of potential contestants claiming to 
take under a mistakenlv rendered or mistakenlv 
omitted term? There are many reasons for thinking 
not. As the recent cases discussed earlier illustrate, 
the real sphere for relief against mistake has been in 
cases of deficient lawyering. The Taff case could not 
have arisen if counsel had worded the will to speak 
of "my natural heirs." In Engle v.  Siegel, routine good 
drafting would have provided a further disposition 
for the contingency that one of the testators' mothers 
predeceased them. In Snide, all that the lawyer had to 
do in order to prevent the mistake was to read the 
first line of the document that he gave his client to 
execute. 
The existence of relief in these cases will not work 
as a magnet for groundless claims against well- 
drafted wills. Existing reformation practice in contract 
and conveyancing has disclosed no such problem, 
and the reason seems obvious. The clear-and-con- 
vincing-evidence standard would impose too onerous 
a burden of proof upon the proponent of a spurious 
claim. Indeed, as we argued, the recognition of a 
reformation doctrine would serve to increase the level 
of safeguard in cases like Kremlick, Taff, and Engle v.  
Siege1 that are now treated as "mere construction" 
ca;es without attention to the clear-and-convincing- 
evidence standard. It is far better to operate an hon- 
est reformation doctrine that relieves the pressure for 
subterfuge and sets an appropriate test for relief. 
We should emphasize that, not only will the refor- 
mation doctrine have negligible effect upon well- 
drafted instruments, it will also not encourage drafts- 
men to become slovenly. Precisely because the 
reformation doctrine is a rule of litigation, no drafts- 
man would plan to rely on it when proper drafting 
can spare the expense and hazard of litigation. Every 
incentive to good drafting would remain. 
A special characteristic of the proofs in the typical 
mistake case is that the testimony of the scrivener 
who made the mistake is frequently the predominant 
piece of evidence. On first impression this is a dis- 
turbing factor. We can imagine a duplicitous 
draftsman conniving with an interested contestant 
after the testator's death and testifying to a supposed 
mistake of which the draftsman has sole knowledge. 
Reflection will show why this danger is remote and 
why it has not figured in those areas of the law 
where analogous mistakes have been remedied-the 
"mere construction" cases in testation and the refor- 
mation cases in contract and conveyance that involve 
instruments uttered by persons now deceased. A 
lawyer-draftsman has strong disincentives to plead 
his own slovenliness: It is not exactly a business- 
getter, it is costly in professional esteem, it may give 
rise to malpractice liability, and in extreme cases it 
can lead to professional discipline. Normally, there- 
fore, the opposite danger is the serious one-that the 
lawyer will conceal his blunder. 
Malpractice Liabddy 
Because the error in many mistake cases is suffi- 
ciently egregious that a victim might be able to 
invoke the malpractice liability of the lawyer-drafts- 
man if relief for mistake were denied, the argument 
can be made that the malpractice remedy makes relief 
for mistake unnecessary. We think that there are a 
variety of responses to this contention. 
Initially, we note that there is a range of mistake 
cases that fall outside the scope of malpractice relief, 
including homedrawn wills and those lawyer-drafted 
wills where for whatever reason the mistake does 
not rise to the level of malpractice. Furthermore, in a 
considerable fraction of lawyer malpractice cases, 
the draftsman may be wholly or partially judgment- 
proof, as when he is long since deceased, or when he 
is uninsured or underinsured. 
More fundamentally, the change in theory from 
devise to tort raises a serious problem of unjust 
enrichment. Whereas most forms of malpractice 
inflict deadweight loss that can only be put right by 
compensation, in these testamentary mistake cases 
a benefit is being transferred from the intended ben- 
eficiary to a mistaken devisee. That devisee is a 
volunteer lacking any claim of entitlement or justified 
reliance. The malpractice solution would leave the 
benefit where it fortuitously fell, thereby creating a 
needless loss to be charged against the draftsman (or 
his insurer). So long as the draftsman's error was 
innocent (which is what distinguishes mistake from 
fraud), there is no reason to exaggerate his liability in 
this way. If, on the other hand, the lawyer were 
charged with the malpractice but subrogated to the 
tort plaintiff's mistake claim, the reformation doctrine 
would simply be recognized in a circular and more 
litigious fashion. 
We do not mean to say that negligent draftsmen 
will be immune from malpractice liability in testa- 
mentary mistake cases. When the malpractice causes 
true loss, that loss should be compensable. One such 
item of compensable loss may be the reasonable liti- 
gation expenses of the parties to the reformation (or 
other) proceeding occasioned by the mistake. We can 
also imagine circumstances in which a mistake might 
come to light after distribution and dissipation of 
the mistakenly devised property; here the change of 
position of the mistaken devisee would constitute 
justified reliance and require that the intended bene- 
ficiary be remitted to his malpractice remedy. 
So long as it is human to err, instances of mistaken 
terms in wills are inevitable. The impulse to remedy 
these errors in order to prevent unjust enrichment 
is also deeply rooted in our sense of justice, which is 
why the simplistic rule forbidding relief against mis- 
take is dissolving. With the barriers to the receipt 
of extrinsic evidence coming down, and with theories 
now developed for overcoming the unattested lan- 
guage problem, courts will be presented with mistake 
cases ever more persistently. 
To be sure, business as usual can continue. The 
courts can go on manipulating supposed rules of 
construction, and they can make more exceptions. We 
think that a principled reformation doctrine has all 
the advantages over the patchwork of inconsistency 
and injustice that characterize the present law. The 
purposes of the discredited no-reformation rule will 
be better served under an explicit reformation 
doctrine that puts mistake cases to the test of an 
appropriate standard of proof. 
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